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I. Introduction 
Endless leverage certificates (ELCs) are structured products engineered by European 
banks that are marketed to retail investors. In essence, an ELC is a levered position in an 
underlying security, which can be long or short. If an investor buys an ELC-long from the 
issuer, the latter buys, on the investor’s behalf, one unit of the underlying, and finances 
part of the purchase with a loan. The loan, referred to as the financing level, accrues 
interest daily and is adjusted for dividend payments on the underlying. The interest rate 
on the financing level is set at a fixed spread above a riskfree benchmark such as Euribor.  
The issuer’s position is protected by a stoploss or knockout level. As long as the value of 
the underlying is above the stoploss level, the security is alive, and its intrinsic value is 
simply the difference between the value of the underlying and the financing level. When 
the market price of the underlying breaches the stoploss level, the bank sells the 
underlying and the security holder receives the proceeds of the liquidating sale minus the 
financing level. Analogously, for an ELC-short, the issuer short-sells one unit of the 
underlying and keeps the proceeds in a designated interest accruing account. Upon breach 
of the stoploss of an ELC-short, the issuer liquidates the position and the holder receives 
the financing level minus the outlay needed to cover the short position. Investors have the 
right to exercise: they can order the bank to unwind the levered position before a stoploss 
event occurs. Alternatively, ELC-holders can also sell their security in the secondary 
market, where the issuing banks are the most active market makers and post narrow bid-
ask spreads. 
ELCs have become very popular in Europe where they are marketed to retail investors 
under names such as Turbos, Waves, Mini-Futures or Speeders. In July 2007 there were 
more than 30,000 ELC contracts outstanding in Germany and the Netherlands alone, and 
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the total monthly trading turnover in Germany topped €9 billion.1 ELCs are also popular 
in Switzerland and Austria, and have also been introduced in France, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, among others. 
We attribute the success of ELCs within the class of structured product to the relative 
simplicity of the contract.2 Despite the fact that they are derivatives, their value is 
virtually independent of volatility and interest rates. ELCs have a delta of unity, while 
their other Greeks are zero. Hence, ELCs liberate leverage seeking investors from 
complex option pricing formulas, implied volatilities and dividend adjustments. Because 
the option component of an ELC is small, investors can readily compare the intrinsic 
value with the price quotes to ascertain that they get a competitive deal. An advantage for 
the issuer is the constant hedge ratio, which makes ELCs very simple to hedge. 
The most widespread structured products to date are covered warrants, which essentially 
are European-style option contracts written by banks. They are popular in almost all 
countries with an active stock exchange outside the United States. Banks write covered 
warrants on indices, stocks, baskets of stocks, commodities and exchange rates, among 
others.3 The main attraction of covered warrants is that they tend to be more liquid than 
regular options that originate on exchanges. For regular options, the large amount of 
series outstanding tends to reduce liquidity per series. For covered warrants, the issuing 
banks assume the role of market makers. The issuers have an incentive to make their 
warrants look attractive by quoting narrow bid-ask spreads. Chan and Pinder (2000) 
investigate warrants listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, and find that they are 
overpriced by up to 10% compared to the exchange issued options on the same 
underlyings. They explain large part of this difference to the higher liquidity of the 
                                                 
1 Source: websites of ABN AMRO, Commerzbank, Deutsches Derivate Institut (DDI), and Deutsche 
Börse. For a comparison, during the same period, the combined trading turnover of the 30 Xetra-Dax stocks 
was € 172 billion (source Deutsche Börse).  
2 The raison-d’être for the Structured Products class as a whole is that these at first sight redundant 
securities offer investors lower transaction costs, on set-up and liquidation, than the replicating portfolios. 
3 Covered warrants are very different from corporate warrants, options on primary shares issued by 
corporations (e.g. as a ‘sweetener’ to debt issues or to raise equity finance in rights issues). 
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warrants. Ter Horst and Veldt (2004) study a sample of 111 warrants issued on Dutch 
stocks and find an average overpricing of 29% vis-à-vis options. They attribute this to 
behavioral biases, and to the complexity of estimating the true value. 
Since the start of the third millennium, a plethora of complex structured products have 
been introduced and marketed to retail investors under names such as guaranteed return 
certificates, click-funds, reverse convertibles, turbos, sprinters, double-ups, or airbags. 
These products offer complex payoff schedules and include multiple and exotic option 
features. Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) provide a taxonomy of structured products, and 
report that on average structured products are overpriced by 4%.4,5 They find that 
structured products are overpriced by, on average, 4%. Moreover, they report that 
overpricing is more severe for more complicated products, and that overpricing decreases 
over the life of the product. The retail market for structured products has grown 
dramatically in virtually all markets outside the United States.6 One explanation for the 
relative absence of structured products in the U.S. is the strict regulation by the SEC, 
which restricts the marketing of structured products on the scale that is common in the 
rest of the world. At the same time, trading on margin and short-selling is readily 
available to U.S. retail investors. Indeed, trading ELCs is very similar to margin trading. 
                                                 
4 The authors distinguish between combinations of plain vanilla options and products with exotic 
components. The most popular variations of the first category are the classic reverse convertibles (long 
bond, short put), corridors (long-call, short-call with Xl<Xs), guarantee products (i.e. bond, call), 
outperformance products (stock, long-call, 2×short-call with Xl<Xs). In the second category we find barrier 
options and double barrier products. 
5 Other studies on complex structured products include Burth et al. (2001), who distinguish concave and 
convex structured products in the Swiss market and find overpricing of 2%, Grünbichler and Wohlwend 
(2005) who compare implied volatilities of the put option component of Swiss reverse convertibles with 
those of EUREX options, and find primary market overpricing, which decreases in the secondary market, 
and Hernandez et al. (2007), who study outperformance certificates and find overpricing of 2%-3%. 
6 In the 1980s index certificates, such as MICDs, SPINs and SPDRs were introduced in the U.S.. They were 
investigated by Chen and Kensinger (1990) and Chen and Sears (1990) and Baubonis et al (1993), who 
estimated that the instruments were overpriced by 2-4% upon issue and that overpricing gradually 
disappeared over the life of the security. In 2001, Reverse Convertibles were introduced in the U.S. by 
ABN AMRO. See Benet et al. (2006) for an analysis. 
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The key difference with margin trading is that for ELCs each position has an attached 
margin account, for which no margin calls are made but unwinding occurs automatically 
when the position’s leverage reaches a predetermined level. 
Following the tradition of the literature, our main research question is whether ELCs are 
competitively priced and traded. In particular, we study three potential caveats for 
investors. A first worry that ELC traders may have are the bid-ask spreads that are quoted 
by the issuing banks in the aftermarket. We find that the spreads on ELCs are remarkably 
narrow. In January 2007, there were 5,129 ELCs written on the 30 Xetra DAX stocks. 
From quote snapshots, we find a median bid-ask spread of €0.02, or 0.68% of the value 
of the ELC.  
To compare bid-ask spreads across derivatives, we develop a novel statistic, the leverage 
adjusted spread, which essentially is the bid ask spread expressed as a percentage of the 
underlying value that it claims. For a large sample of ELCs we find the median leverage 
adjusted spread to be 0.18%, almost half the median leverage adjusted spread on covered 
warrants, which we find to be 0.30%. 
Consistent with market microstructure theory, we find that leverage adjusted spreads 
increase in various risk proxies, such as the bid-ask spread and the historic volatility of 
the underlying. More interesting is that bid-ask spreads decrease over the life of the 
security, despite the endless nature of the security. We attribute this phenomenon to time 
varying competition in secondary market: for young ELCs, the issuing banks are the only 
sellers, while for seasoned ELCs, retail investors start competing in the limit order book. 
Consistent with this the time pattern in spreads, we also find that pricing errors relative to 
intrinsic values decrease in the age of the security. 
A second danger for ELC-investors is that the security may be overpriced vis-à-vis the 
risk adjusted theoretical value. Overpricing can be due to the interest rates that issuers 
charge on the financing levels. These interest rates are set at a predetermined riskfree 
benchmark such as Euribor or EONIA plus a credit spread. The credit spread, typically 
200 basispoints, is fixed over the life of the security. This average spread seems high for 
the seemingly low risk for the issuing banks. 
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However, because ELC-holders have the right to exercise, a lower bound for the value of 
an ELC is its intrinsic value. Apart from the right to exercise, ELC-holders hold a 
valuable default put option: if the price of the underlying precipitates through the stop-
loss and the financing level in one swift movement, the ELC-holders’ loss is limited 
while the bank suffers a default on the loan. Our finding that the observed premium 
increases in risk-proxies suggests that the limited liability option is indeed appreciated by 
the market. 
To gauge whether market prices are fair, we derive a value function for ELCs. We show 
that an ELC has an optimal exercise level which increases at the same rate as the 
financing level. Or, in equilibrium, an ELC should be alive as long as the value of the 
underlying lies between the observable stoploss level and an unobservable optimal 
exercise level. In this region the value of the ELC is higher than its intrinsic value. The 
optimal exercise level can be found from the trade off between the value of the default 
put and the cost of the credit spread on the financing level. 
To estimate the ELC-values, we develop a Monte-Carlo algorithm that uses historical 
returns to find expected payoffs under different exercise strategies. Our analysis shows 
that an ELC-long on an average Xetra-DAX stock with financing level of €100 and a 
stoploss level €105, has an optimal exercise level of €106.20. The maximum value of the 
option component is approximately €0.005, or 0.1% of the value of ELC.7 For ELC-
shorts the maximum value of the option component is 0.3% of the intrinsic value. 
Empirically, we find, for a sample of 25,645 quote snapshots, an average midprice 
premium over the intrinsic value of 0.51% for ELC-longs and 1.00%, suggesting that the 
average overpricing is less than 1%. Expressed as a percentage of the underlying it 
claims, the average midprice premium over intrinsic value is 0.14% for ELC-shorts and 
0.20% for ELC-longs. 
A third potential pitfall for investors is the fairness of ELC terminations. Upon breach of 
a stoploss level, the issuer unwinds the position and returns the residual value to the ELC 
                                                 
7 The maximum is reached when the value of the underlying is €105.25, so that the intrinsic value of the 
ELC is €5.25. 
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holder. Most issuers publish residual values on their websites. We find that, on average, 
the underlying is liquidated 0.21% beyond the stoploss level. This shortfall is not 
necessarily unfair. It may be due to discontinuous trading or to the average price jump 
that triggers the stoploss. Moreover, the loss on unwinding may be aggravated by a 
market inefficient price impact. 
To further gauge the fairness of ELC terminations, we conduct an intraday event study on 
all German stock ELC terminations from August until October 2006. Interestingly, we 
find a significant increase in trading activity around the stoploss breach. For stoploss 
events of ELC-shorts we also find a discernable price impact, of approximately 20%, 
immediately following the trigger. For ELC-longs we find no such price impact. 
To our knowledge, ELCs have not yet been widely investigated, despite the growing 
relevance for these structured products. In earlier paper, Entrop, Scholz, and Wilkens 
(2007) find that ELCs may be overpriced by up to 25%. In contrast to us, they assume 
that the underlying follows a continuous price process with no trade interruptions so that 
there is no default risk for the bank. Subsequently the bank’s profit potential increases – 
without bound - in the investors’ holding period. We argue that the bank’s position is not 
risk free and derive an optimal holding period in terms of the value of the underlying. 
Our value function gives an equilibrium price, which is dependent of the assumed return 
distribution and does not rely on investor irrationality. 
In the next section we describe the ELC market in greater detail and discuss our sample. 
In section III we assess the bid-ask spreads in the secondary market. In section IV we 
develop a valuation function for ELCs, and conduct a Monte Carlo procedure to estimate 
the value of the option value of a typical ELC. Section V investigates ELC mid-prices, 
compared with intrinsic values. In section VI we look at residual values and study the 
price impact on termination. Section VII concludes. 
II. ELC terminology and data description 
We define ELCs as securities that are open-ended, and have intrinsic values in the form 
of |S-D|, where S is the value of the underlying and D is a financing level which increases 
at a well specified interest rate, rD, that is set at a constant spread over a risk free 
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benchmark. Financing levels should be protected by a stoploss level, denoted K, so that if 
the underlying breaches the stoploss level, the issuer automatically terminates the 
contract and pays the ELC holder a residual value. Any dividends paid by the underlying 
should accrue to the financing level.8 
Figure 1 gives the payoff- and value-diagrams for ELCs. The payoff occurs upon exercise 
or through a stoploss event. It is bounded below by zero. This limited liability option 
gives an ELC a value that is slightly higher than its intrinsic value. Notice that in Figure 1 
we exaggerate the option component of the ELC, to make the payoff and value diagrams 
distinguishable. We shall later see that the option value is very small. 
----- Figure 1 around here ---- 
The ELC is the successor of the Turbo-certificate, an instrument with maturity date and a 
fixed financing and stoploss level.9 Although the first ELC contract can be traced back to 
2001, they have become particularly popular since 2004. Figure 2 illustrates the success 
of ELCs. From Panel A we see that the number of outstanding ELC contracts in Germany 
and the Netherlands has doubled in 2006. From Panel B we see that the major players are 
Commerzbank and ABN AMRO, who both claim the product’s invention, and that fifteen 
other players are competing for a share of the growing ELC market. Panel C shows 
market shares by types of underlying. We see that although 65% of all ELCs that were 
outstanding in the last quarter of 2006 were written on stocks, 65% of the trading 
turnover comes from index ELCs. 
----- Figure 2 around here ---- 
Banks periodically issue bundles of ELCs to themselves on the back of a comprehensive 
base prospectus and a brief final terms sheet. Table 1 gives an overview of the main 
                                                 
8 This means that on ex-dividend day, the financing level of an ELC-long (-short) is adjusted downward 
(upward) by the dividend amount. This feature makes the ELC independent of dividend yield or dividend 
payment dates. This construction is similar for Australian “endowment warrants”, covered warrants for 
which the strike price is reset upon dividend payment. See Brown and Davis (2004) for an analysis of these 
products. 
9 Essentially, Turbo-certificates charge interest upfront, for a predetermined maximum length of the loan. 
See Schulz, Baule and Wilkens (2004) and Muck (2006) for an analysis of Turbo-certificates. 
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contract specifications for the eight largest issuers in the German market. We see that 
issuers market their ELCs under different names, and that credit spreads and other 
characteristics vary across banks. Most issuers adjust the stoploss levels K once a month, 
some issuers adjust K daily.10 
The adjustment of K is to a large extent at the issuer’s discretion. In general, K moves at 
the same rate as D, but monthly instead of daily. However, most issuers reserve the right 
to set the knockout level further from the financing level if they feel that the perceived 
risk of the underlying has increased. Some issuers specify a range for the stoploss 
premium, |K-D|/D. Many issuers bestow their ELCs with a ratio, which refers to the 
number of underlying units per certificate. Ratios are chosen by the bank to arrive at 
particular price ranges.11 
----- Table 1 around here ---- 
When an issuer sells an ELC-long (-short), it immediately buys (short-sells) the 
underlying to hedge its position. Upon breach of the stoploss level of an ELC-long, the 
issuer sells the underlying and returns the proceeds of the liquidating sale minus the 
current financing level to the ELC holder. When an ELC-short is knocked out, the issuer 
buys the underlying with the financing-level to cover the ELC’s short position, and 
returns the residual to the ELC-holder. Issuers specify this unwind procedure in detail in 
the base prospectus and often specify minimum residual values based on the minimum 
(or maximum, for ELC-shorts) market price of the underlying in a specified event 
window around the stoploss event. All issuers publish a list of terminated ELCs and their 
residual values on their websites so that investors can verify that the residual value is 
                                                 
10 Monthly adjustment is the norm. Because of this, K often becomes the focal characteristic to identify an 
ELC. Although ELCs have 12-character ISIN-codes, brokers and traders refer to them with their stoploss 
level, e.g. “Porsche Turbo 806.00” or “Speeder BMW 46.10”.  
11 E.g. a bank may have a policy to ‘aim’ for low prices. E.g. an ELC-long with financing level €24 on a 
stock which trades at €30.30, may be divided into one “Mini-future” trading at €6.30 by one bank or 10 
“Speeders” of €0.63 by another bank. 
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fair.12 In general, cash settlement occurs within a week of the stoploss event. Apart from 
a stoploss breach, ELCs may be terminated if the holder exercises or if the issuer calls. 
Both scenarios lead an unwind procedure similar to a stoploss breach. 
Issuers discourage exercising ELCs by stipulating cumbersome procedures or lags. Two 
issuers stipulate that ELCs can be exercised once a year, for three other issuers the 
exercise opportunity occurs once a month. Even the issuers that allow daily exercise, 
stipulate conditions such as a written notice sent by fax. The result is that investors 
generally prefer to sell instead of exercise, especially because issuers post bid-prices that 
are very close to (and are often higher than) the intrinsic value. When the issuer buys 
back an ELC, its position becomes neutral. We therefore view selling and exercising as 
equivalent. In the prospectuses, issuers usually indicate that they reserve the right to 
unilaterally terminate, or call, the contract if hedging becomes difficult or impossible, 
and specify disruption events (such as takeovers, restructurings, or threats thereof) when 
an ELC can be called. 
----- Table 2 around here ---- 
Since short-selling is not allowed (for bets against the underlying investors can buy ELC-
shorts), the first trades after an ELC-issue are predominantly buys. After issuance the 
sponsoring bank becomes the most active market maker. The aftermarket is a focal venue 
of competition between the different issuers, causing bid-ask spreads to be relatively 
narrow. Issuers also compete on other characteristics. Table 2 illustrates the differences in 
ELC characteristics marketed by the eight largest issuers of stock-ELCs during our 
sample period in January 2007. Apart from quoting low credit spreads and narrow bid-
ask spreads, issuers make their ELCs attractive by issuing them at high levers (defined as 
S/|S-D|) and low stoploss premiums. During our sampling period, Bank C issued ELCs 
with relatively high levers and low average stoploss premiums. They charged the lowest 
credit spreads on the financing levels, and quoted narrow bid-ask spreads. These 
competitive features made Bank C’s ELCs the most actively traded, at least in January 
                                                 
12 The detail of residual value reporting varies. Some issuers only disclose the ISSN numbers and residual 
values, while others give the stop-loss and financing levels, as well as the termination date or even the time, 
to the second. 
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2007. When Bank B entered the market they issued even more aggressive ELCs, as 
gauged by their levers and stoploss premiums. Apart from differentiating their ELCs on 
product characteristics, issuing banks also market their products aggressively using 
internet banners and newspapers ads. The typical tagline emphasizes the leveraged 
returns, the limited liability, and the endless nature of the product, e.g. “Big opportunities 
with small stakes.” “Unlimited upside, limited downside”13 
III. The bid-ask spread in the secondary market. 
In this section we investigate the liquidity of ELCs. We collect snapshot quotes from 
German Internet broker www.cortalconsors.de, and their Netherlands based colleague 
www.binck.nl, who both provide real time quotes for substantially all structured products 
available to German and Dutch retail-investors. We only consider structured products on 
the 30 Xetra-DAX stocks and the 25 AEX stocks.14 We complement the quote data with 
the relevant ELC-characteristics, which we collected from the issuers’ websites. In total 
we take five quote snapshots during morning trading hours on different working days in 
January 2007 for 5,129 Dax-underlying and 444 AEX-underlying ELCs. For comparison, 
we also take 20 contemporaneous snapshots of bid and ask quotes of their underlying 
securities and five snapshots of 18,003 covered warrants (“Optionscheinen” in German) 
written on Xetra-DAX stocks, and 6,141 option contracts on AEX stocks that were 
outstanding during our sampling period. 
----- Table 3 around here ---- 
Table 3 gives the comparative statistics of the bid-ask spreads. For the German market, 
the average ELC bid-ask spread is €0.049, or 0.977% of the security’s midquote, which is 
significantly lower than the average spread for covered warrants. We also compute the 
                                                 
13 On the Goldman Sachs website we read “Large chances with limited stakes. With Mini-futures investors 
can accelerate price developments. The volatility does not affect the value. The lifespan is unlimited.” 
(“Grosse Chancen bei kleinem Kapitaleinsatz. Mit Mini-futures nehmen Anleger ueberproportional an der 
Kursentwicklung des Basiswerts teil. Die volatilität hat keinen enfluss auf den preis der Mini-Futures, die 
Laufzeit ist unbegrenzt.”)  
14 ELCs are also offered the most liquid madcap stocks and on foreign stocks (including large American 
firms such as Microsoft or Google). 
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spreads per unit of underlying, by multiplying the gross spread by the derivatives’ ratio 
and hedge ratio. We denote these the leverage adjusted spreads. For ELCs, the average 
absolute and relative leverage adjusted spreads are €0.17 and 0.24% respectively. The 
leverage adjusted spreads for covered warrants are more than twice as high. This provides 
strong evidence that the secondary market for ELCs is at least as competitive as the 
market for covered warrants. The spread pattern is mirrored in the Dutch market, even 
though we find €-spreads to be smaller, and proportional spreads to be higher, on 
average. These differences are mostly due to the different average denominations. 
Nevertheless, the leverage adjusted spreads on ELCs are still about four times higher than 
the spreads on the underlying, suggesting that for unconstrained investors in a transaction 
cost free world, it would be cheaper to trade directly in the underlying. We attribute the 
difference between ELC spreads and underlying spreads mainly to the administration, 
hedging and listing costs. For investors, transaction costs are mostly proportional of 
transaction value. In a world with transaction costs, buying ELCs is likely to be cheaper 
than opening a position in the underlying.15 In addition, the increased spreads may also be 
due to a higher adverse selection that in the ELC market. Biais and Hillion (1990) and 
Chan et al. (1995) suggest that resource constrained informed investors are more likely to 
liquidate their informational advantage in the derivative markets than in the market for 
the underlying. 
To better understand the determinants of the bid-ask spread on ELCs we regress the 
proportional leverage adjusted spreads on several ELC-characteristics. The results of this 
analysis are given in Table 4. We see that spreads increase in the contemporaneous bid-
ask spread on the underlying, the stoploss premium, and the volatility of the underlying. 
Interestingly, there is no strong evidence that the leverage adjusted spread increases in the 
lever. This suggests that any increased adverse selection costs in the high gearing 
segment is offset by decreased transaction costs, perhaps due to economies of scale.16 
                                                 
15 This is the case as long as the ELC’s lever is higher than four. In this case the increased bid-ask spreads 
is more than offset by a reduction in the transaction fees.  
16 Although we have only limited turnover data, industry sources told us that trade is concentrated in high 
lever ELCs. 
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----- Table 4 around here ---- 
The positive coefficient on the stoploss premium suggests that this ELC-characteristic is 
a risk-proxy. Indeed, issuers indicate that they set higher stoploss levels for riskier stocks. 
When we include issuer-, day-, and underlying-dummies in the regression, the positive 
coefficient on the stoploss premium vanishes. The most interesting finding of Table 4 is 
that age affects the observed bid-ask spreads. Although ELCs are endless, and age does 
not affect the fundamental value of the security, bid-ask spreads decrease by 
approximately 0.10% for each additional year of age. This finding is reminiscent of life-
cycle mispricing that has been documented for closed end mutual funds and other 
structured products (Weiss, 1989; Peavy, 1990; Stoimenov and Wilkens, 2005). We 
attribute this effect to the increase in secondary market competition. Upon issuance of a 
new ELC-series, the issuer is the monopolist buyer and seller, but as ELCs become more 
seasoned, the issuer is likely to receive competition in the limit order book, especially on 
the sell-side.17 
IV. Valuing ELCs 
To gauge whether the return on ELCs is commensurate with their risk, we need to value 
the instrument. There are two main difficulties with this task. First, we have to deal with 
the complex option component of the ELC. Second, we need to account for the kurtosis 
and discontinous trade that characterize the underlyings’ returns. 
In this section we offer a first attempt to value a typical ELC. First, we decompose the 
instrument into four components:  
          ELC  = |S-D| – PV(credit spread) + Default Put + Exercise Put (1) 
The first part, the absolute difference between the value of the underlying and the 
financing level, is the intrinsic value. The second part is the present value of the credit 
spread. This riskless cashflow stream accrues to the issuer. The value of this component 
depends on the expected time until knockout. In exchange for the credit spread, the ELC-
                                                 
17 ELCs are traded on limit order book trading platforms, where retail investors can improve on the market 
makers’ quotes. 
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holder obtains two options. First, the ELC contains a Default Put which gives the holder 
the right to put the underlying to the bank in exchange for forgiveness of the loan. This 
option is valuable if there exists a positive probability that the underlying precipitates 
through the financing level before it is knocked out, leaving the issuer with a loss. 
Second, the ELC holder has holds an exercise put. This option gives the holder the right 
to exchange the security for the intrinsic value at any time before knockout. 
Due to the latter option, the intrinsic value is a lower bound for the ELC value.  The 
reason for this is that if we would have PV(credit spread) > Default Put, the holder would 
exercise the Exercise Put and claim the intrinsic value. If the underlying follows a 
sufficiently smooth process, and if it is continuously traded in a market with sufficient 
depth, the value of the default put is zero, so that the intrinsic value is also the upper 
bound for the ELC-value. Or, exercisable ELCs on ‘jump-free’, continuously traded 
underlyings should not exist in an otherwise frictionless world, and if they do exist, they 
offer arbitrage profits to the issuing banks. Entrop et al. (2007) take this view and assume 
that ELC-holders exercise suboptimally. Naturally, the later the holders exercise, the 
larger the profits for the bank. If the holders never exercise, and hold the ELC until 
knockout, the expected profit to the bank is infinite. 
We know however that underlying securities do not follow smooth processes and are not 
continuously traded. Default events can occur intraday, upon a dramatic instantaneous 
jump in the value of the underlying, or overnight, when there is no trade. In the following 
we derive a value function for the option component of an ELC under the following 
simplifying assumptions: 
Assumption 1: A trading day has two periods: daytime, when there is continuous trade 
and the price follows a smooth process between an opening and a closing auction, and 
overnight, when there is no trade. 
Assumption 2: There are no transaction costs, and there is no price impact. The unwind 
procedure triggered by a stoploss or exercise event is frictionless and immediate. 
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Assumption 3: The financing- and knockout levels are constant during the trading day and 
are reset every morning at the opening auction. Both levels increase at the same constant 
rate: 1 1ln lnt tELC
t t
D Kr D K
+ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ . 
Assumption 4: The default risk is non-systematic. 
Assumption 5: The issuer will not unilaterally unwind (“call”) the security. 
Assumption 6: The ELC holder exercises so as to maximize the value of the security. 
Our assumptions closely reflect industry practice. Assumption 2 implies that we do not 
consider the issuer’s option to pay the minimum possible residual value given the 
conditions in the prospectus. From table 1 we know that most ELC-contracts specify a 
guaranteed minimum residual value, typically based on the lowest stockprice within a 
time interval (often three hours) after the stoploss trigger. In the next section we 
document evidence that issuers do not systematically pay the contractual minimum 
residual value, and unwind on a best-efforts basis. Similarly, assumption 5 states that 
banks do not opportunistically call, even though it may be optimal if the value of the 
underlying approaches the stoploss level. Empirically, we do not find any terminations 
near K, consistent with our assumption. We attribute the bank’s commitment to not 
opportunistically call ELCs to the repeated game nature of the business. Clearly, in a one 
shot game, the equilibrium value is simply the intrinsic value |S-D|: if the value were 
higher, the issuer calls, and if the value were lower, the holder exercises. 
Notice that if banks do behave opportunistically, the option component is less valuable 
than indicated by our estimation. Assumptions 1 and 4 on the other hand negatively bias 
our estimate: clearly, the existence of daytime jumps and systematic risk increases the 
value of the default put, and hence of the ELC. 
In assumption 6, we conjecture that there is an optimal exercise level. Every evening, 
ELC-holders can decide to exercise the security. If they keep the security alive, they 
essentially buy an overnight limited liability option (the default put) which limits their 
loss (vis-à-vis holding the underlying directly) in case the underlying precipitates through 
the financing level during the night. The price they pay for this downside protection is the 
overnight credit spread on the financing level. Clearly, the greater the distance between S 
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and D, the lower the value of the default put. Because the credit spread is constant, we 
conjecture that if the underlying reaches some optimal exercise level E*, the credit spread 
no longer justifies the value of the default put, leading rational ELC-holders to exercise.  
Hence, if the underlying trades between K and E*, the true value of the issuer’s position, 
which we denote L(S) (for loan), is lower than its facevalue value D. In a frictionless 
market, a rational ELC-holder exercises as soon as the true value of the loan is higher 
than its face value. The optimal exercise level E* is thus given by the value of the 
underlying for which we have L(S) = D. Because the financing level does not accrue 
interest during the day, it is optimal for the holder to make her exercise decision at the 
end of trading day, at the closing auction. 
In the following, we let tS′  and tS′′  denote the value of the underlying at the opening and 
closing auction of trading day t respectively. Similarly, we let *( , , )t t t tL S D K E′ ′  and 
*( , , )t t t tL S D K E′′ ′′  stand for the true value of the financing level during the opening and 
closing auction. The overnight riskfree rate is given by r. The probability distribution of 
the next day's opening price, 1tS +′ , conditional on tS′′ , is denoted 1( )tS +′ψ . If during the 
closing auction of day t, the holder does not exercise the ELC, the value of the financing 
level is given by: 
 
1 1
1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1 1
0
( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
t t
D K
r
t t t t t t t t t t
D K
L S D K E e S d S D d S L S d S
+ +
+ +
∞
−
+ + + + + +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= ψ + ψ + ψ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫ ∫                (2) 
The first integral refers to the states of the world where the loan defaults, and the bank 
recovers 1 1t tS D+ +′ < . The second integral refers to the states where the ELC is knocked out 
and the loan is fully recovered. The integrant in the final integral denotes the value of the 
loan at the opening auction of the following day if the ELC is not knocked out overnight. 
We now let ( )tS′π  denote the probability of a knockout during daytime, and let ( )tS′′ϑ  
stand for the probability distribution function of the closing price conditional on tS′  and 
on not seeing a daytime stoploss. The value of the financing level at the opening auction 
is then: 
 16
      ( ) ( )( ) ( )
*
1
*
1 1
*
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L S D K E S D S L S d S D d S
+
+ +
∞
+ + + + + + + + + + +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= π + −π ϑ + ϑ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫           (3) 
The first term on the right hand side refers to a daytime knockout. Due to continuous 
trading and sufficient market depth, the issuer recoups the loan in its entirety. The second 
term conjectures that the ELC-holder keeps the ELC alive if the stock closes below * 1tE + , 
and exercises otherwise. In the later event, the bank recovers the loan’s face value, Dt+1. 
Notice that we do not discount the closing payoffs. This is because the effective daytime 
interest rate is zero.18 In equilibrium, ELC-holders exercise if the value of the loan 
reaches its face value. Hence, *tE  solves: 
 * *( , , )t t t t tL E D K E D′′ =  t∀              (4) 
It immediately follows that if the daytime and overnight return distributions are 
stationary, *tE  increases together with Dt and Kt, at rELC. 
Unfortunately, the system of equations (2)-(4) cannot be solved analytically, due to 
repeated integration. Therefore we recur to a Monte Carlo simulation to find the exercise 
levels and values for several ELCs. 
From Datastream we collect 15 years worth of historical intraday return data for all 
Xetra-DAX stocks. In total we have 97,288 days of open-low, open-high, low-close, 
high-close and close-open returns. Because the value of the option component is very 
sensitive to extreme outcomes, we pool the data to model a “typical” DAX-stock.19 The 
return distributions of both the daytime and overnight returns are significantly 
leptokurtic, with the kurtosis of the overnight return being particularly severe, at 142.87. 
Moreover, the overnight returns are positively skewed. Figure 2 illustrates the empirical 
distribution of the daytime and intraday returns. 
                                                 
18 This is because central banks levy interest rates, and apply reserve requirements, on overnight deposits. 
19 In an earlier version of this paper we valued ELCs for each underlying. We found a large disparity 
between values. I.e., due to a single negative overnight return of -59% in its history, we found one stock’s 
ELCs to be significantly underpriced. Another stock did not have any overnight returns of lower than 5% in 
the last 15 years, hinting that any ELC on this stock would be overpriced.  
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----- Figure 2 around here ---- 
We standardize our ELCs to have D = €100, and evaluate ELC-values for different credit 
spreads and different stoploss values K. Each simulation occurs in two stages. First we 
search for the optimal exercise level *tE  by evaluating the evening value with *t tS E′′=  and 
look for the *tE  so that the average payoff for the bank over 100,000 ELC-runs just 
equals D. Then we evaluate the evening value for other *( , )t t tS K E′′∈ . 
In our simulation we assume that all historic return observations are equally likely, and 
hence that there is no autocorrelation in the first or second moment. For every ELC run, 
we randomly select, with replacement, an open-low/low-close return combination from 
all intraday returns, and an overnight return from all historic overnight returns. We do 
this until the ELC terminates through either a stoploss or exercise. See appendix for the 
actual algorithm used. 
Figure 3 gives the estimated value of the option component for six ELCs on the 
hypothetical typical DAX-stock. We find that the value of the option component first 
increases and then decreases over the range where the ELC is alive. This pattern can be 
explained by the fact that the two options offset each other: when the value of the default 
put is high, the option to exercise is low, and vice versa. 
----- Figure 3 ----- 
Our simulations suggest that an ELC-long with a typical stoploss premium of 5% and 
typical credit spread of 200 basispoints, written on a typical DAX stock, has a value that 
is always less than €0.005 higher than its intrinsic value. This typical ELC-long has an 
optimal exercise level €106.40, which means that it should be alive only if the underlying 
trades in the region S ∈ (€105, €106.40). We find the expected life of this ELC to be 1.4 
days, maximum.20 Not surprisingly, ELC values, feasible regions and life-spans are larger 
for lower credit spreads and lower stoploss premiums. Consistent with observed prices, 
we find that the option component of ELC-shorts is significantly higher than that of ELC-
                                                 
20 This maximum obtains when the stock trades at S = €106.0. The maximum lifespan for the ELC-short 
with K=96.23 and credit spread of 200 basispoints is 4.8 days. It obtains when S = €90.9. 
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longs. We attribute this difference to the skewness of the overnight return distribution. Of 
our 97,288 historic overnight returns, 229 were higher than 5%, while 175 were lower 
than -5%.21 
From our simulation we also find that the default probability of an ELC-long financing 
level that is collateralized by a typical DAX stock with a stoploss premium of 5% is 
approximately 0.4%. In case of default, the recovery rate is approximately 97.8%. The 
default probability on a ELC-short financing level is approximately 1.7%, and the 
recovery rate 97.9%.22 
The most important observation however is that we find the option value to be very small 
compared to the value of the ELC. In the interval where the option component is 
valuable, the ELC value is at least €5.00, implying that the option value is at most 0.1% 
of the value of the ELC.  
V. Price and Intrinsic Value 
The small value of the option component makes ELCs attractive to investors, because 
they can easily ascertain the instruments’ values by computing the intrinsic value. 
Because ELC-investors can exercise their securities and claim the intrinsic value at a 
relatively low cost, we expect market prices to be bounded below by their intrinsic 
values. This prediction is borne out by the data. For our sample of 5,573 German and 
Dutch ELCs, we compute the differences between the midquotes and their intrinsic 
values, based on contemporaneous midquotes for the underlying. We find an overall 
average absolute premium of €0.019 and an average relative premium of 0.63%. We find 
premiums to be significantly higher for ELC-shorts. The overall premium pattern is 
similar for Germany and the Netherlands, see table 5. 
----- Table 5 around here ---- 
                                                 
21 For even higher absolute returns the skew switches: There were 23 overnight returns that were higher 
than 10%, while 27 returns were lower than -10%. Apparently the skew of absolute returns higher than 5% 
is more important than the extreme tails, at least for ELCs with stoploss premiums of 5% or less. 
22 The estimated default probabilities are the relative frequencies of ELC-defaults in our simulation. Default 
probabilities and recovery rates also depend on S. The values given are averages over the feasible region. 
 19
From Table 5 we see that the economic significance of the observed premiums over 
intrinsic value are small. However, the statistical difference between theoretical and 
observed premiums is significant. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which scatters the 
actually observed premiums, rescaled as if they belonged to ELCs with D = €100. In 
lower part of the diagram we plot the theoretical premium for typical DAX stock ELC 
with a stoploss premium of 3.5% and a credit spread of 200 basispoints, as computed in 
the previous section. 
----- Figure 4 ----- 
If we look at the range of levers in our sample of observed snapshots, we see that 
approximately 95% of all listed DAX stock ELCs had their underlying trading beyond 
the optimal exercise level. This hints that many ELC-traders may exercise (or sell) their 
securities too late.23 As we saw in the previous section, the significantly positive average 
premium over the intrinsic value is not necessarily mispricing. After all ELC consists of 
two valuable options. First the ELC comes with a Default Put that offers investors limited 
liability, in case the underlying precipitates through the stoploss and financing level in a 
single price jump. Second, ELCs give their holders the right to exercise the contract. Due 
to these options we expect ELC-premiums vis-à-vis their intrinsic values to increase in 
the volatility and in the lever, which is a measure of the option’s moneyness. We also 
expect the stoploss level to affect the ELC-premium. This is because ELCs with stoploss 
levels closer to their financing levels can attain higher levers, making the option 
component more valuable. On the other hand, the stoploss level is chosen endogenously 
by the issuer. Banks mention in their prospectuses that they set higher stoploss levels for 
riskier stocks. To gauge how the main ELC characteristics affect ELC prices we carry out 
                                                 
23 Notice that we cannot say much about the percentage or amount of late exercises. First because 
individual stocks have return distributions that are different from the average distribution on which we 
based our calculations. Second, we do not know how many contracts of each listed ELC-series are 
outstanding. Industry sources tell us that the open interest dramatically increases in the lever, which 
suggests that ELC-holders exercise according to theory: when the underlying goes their way. 
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several regressions with as independent variable the ELC premium scaled by the value of 
the underlying.24 Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. 
----- Table 6 around here ---- 
From Table 6 we observe that, consistent with option pricing theory, premiums are higher 
for ELCs written on more risky stocks. Surprisingly, we do not find a positive coefficient 
on the lever. We explain this by the fact that, due to the stoploss level, all ELCs are 
automatically “in the money”. Moreover, we suspect that competition among issuers is 
higher in the high-lever segment of the market. This may offset the theoretical positive 
relationship between lever and option value. The coefficient on the stoploss premium is 
significantly positive, but only when we do not include underlying dummies in the 
regression. This finding suggests that stoploss premiums are risk proxies. Option theory 
predicts a negative coefficient on the stoploss premium, when we control for  underlying 
dummies. However, regression models III and IV return insignificant positive 
coefficients. We attribute our failure to find significant negative coefficients to the lack of 
sufficient cross-sectional variation in stoploss premiums. 
We also regress the premiums on the age of the instrument. Consistent with the spread 
pattern reported earlier, we find a negative relationship between ELC premium and age, 
consistent with an over time increasing competition in the limit order book. 
VI. Residual value and price impact upon unwinding 
A final concern for investors is the fairness of ELC terminations. As mentioned, when an 
ELC breaches its stoploss level, the issuer unwinds the hedge position and returns the 
proceeds of the liquidating sale minus the financing level to the ELC holders. Issuers 
publish the residual values of their terminated ELCs on their websites. To gauge whether 
these terminal values are fair, we collect residual values of ELCs that were knocked out 
during the period January 2006 until May 2007, and for which financing and stoploss 
values were available. Our final sample consists of 1,801 residual values obtained for the 
                                                 
24 If we scale by the value of the intrinsic value, we find a significantly positive relationship between the 
scaled premium and the lever. This relationship is mechanical due to the inverse relationship between the 
lever and the  intrinsic value.  
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four banks that report D and K alongside the residual values. Using Datastream data, we 
ascertain that all residual values concern stoploss triggers.25 We compute the residual 
value shortfalls as the difference between the reported residual value and the theoretical 
stoploss value |K-D|, multiplied by the ratio. In table 7 we report the distribution of the 
residual value shortfalls for the entire sample and several subsamples. 
                                                 
25 We discarded nine terminations that were triggered by an impending takeover, and five that were called 
after a sharp price change. Fourteen ELCs were terminated when they were deep in the money. We suspect 
that these were called because they had too few contracts outstanding to justify a stock market listing. 
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----- Table 7 around here ---- 
Our data includes five financing level defaults, all triggered by the same event. On May 
4th 2007, Pharmaceutical company Altana booked an overnight return of 33.15% and 
knocked out five ELC-shorts, all of which resulted in a loss for the issuer.26 The ELC-
long that came closest to a financing level default was written on Deutsche Telekom. On 
9 August 2006, when the stock closed at €12.05, an ELC with ratio 10 had a D of €10.83 
and K of €11.70. On August 10th, the stock opened at €11.20. During the day the stock 
quickly dropped to €10.90. Three days later, the ELC-holders received a residual value of 
a €0.02, a mere 23% of the theoretical stoploss value.27 
When measured with respect to the stoploss value, the average residual value shortfall in 
our sample was 3.2%. At first sight, this seems a large loss for the ELC-holders. 
However, ELCs are knocked out when their levers are at their highest. We find that the 
average shortfall with respect to the underlying was only 0.24%. This shortfall may 
simply be explained by the average price movement that triggered the stoploss. Our 
finding that in over half of the cases ELC-investors received exactly the theoretical 
stoploss value and that 8.7% of residual values were in fact higher then their theoretical 
stoploss values suggests that the residual values are fair. Our finding of residual value 
shortfalls being slightly higher for ELC-shorts may be explained by larger upward jumps, 
or a price impact that is larger for unwind buys than unwind sales, possibly due to larger 
average open interest for ELC-shorts, or a more aggressive unwinding by the issuer. 
To gauge how much of the average shortfall can be explained by discontinuous trading 
we divide our sample into overnight and daytime triggers. Not surprisingly, we find that 
residual value shortfalls for ELCs triggered overnight to be significantly higher. Panel B 
of table 7 shows that the residual value shortfall is approximately three times larger for 
overnight stop-loss events. We also check whether there are differences in residual value 
                                                 
26 The event was driven by dividend capture. On the day before the stoploss event, Altana closed at €46.50, 
down 8.7%. The next day, the stock started trading net of a special dividend of €34.80. The stock opened at 
€16.99 and reached a daily high of €20.90. Because the short seller is required to pay the dividend in full, 
the stock booked an overnight return of 33.15%. 
27 This implies that the bank unwound the position at an average price of €11.03 (€10.83+10×€0.02). 
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shortfalls between banks. Although we find differences, F-tests cannot reject that the 
banks’ average shortfalls have different means. The differences in standard deviations 
and the percentages of zero shortfalls are statistically significant but may be due to a 
different mix of underlying securities or ratios. 
Apart from the stoploss triggering price jumps, the residual value shortfalls may also be 
due to a price impact that comes with the unwind transactions. Moreover, if a significant 
price impact obtains, it is not inconceivable that the stoploss event is anticipated by 
arbitrageurs who front-run the stoploss event. If there is an expected price impact, 
arbitrageurs could potentially profit by (short-)selling the underlying when it is trading 
within a few ticksizes from the stoploss level, triggering a knockout, and simultaneously 
submitting a limit buy (sell) order for just under (above) the stoploss level. From Table 7 
we find that such an arbitrage profit could be, on average, 0.24% of the position taken in 
the underlying security. Which is probably not enough to cover transaction costs. 
Alternatively, it is conceivable that the issuing banks themselves drive the price through 
the stoploss level over the last couple of tick-sizes before knockout. To investigate the 
price dynamics around stoploss events, we conduct an event study on intraday data. 
We analyze the intraday trading behaviour around the stoploss triggers of 226 ELCs 
written on 42 German stocks during August, September and October 2006.28 For these 
stocks we obtain intraday market data from the Capital market database maintained at the 
University of Karlsruhe.29 We compile time-stamped price and quantity data for all trades 
during the sample period. For every second in the six-hour window around the trigger 
event, we record the last traded price and the volume during the second. We divide prices 
by the stoploss level, multiply them by €100, and take the average across events. Trading 
volumes are expressed in euros, and divided by the average volume per second for the 
day, then averaged across events. Both series are plotted in Figure 5 for 82 ELC-long 
triggers and 144 ELC-short triggers. 
                                                 
28 We considered stoploss events reported by six ELC-issuers. For these banks we also found, from their 
residual value webpages, 29 overnight triggers, 10 erroneous trigger announcements and 7 ELCs that were 
called. We discarded 12 trigger events that occurred during the first 10 minutes of a trading day. 
29 See http://fmi.fbv.uni-karlsruhe.de/ for further information regarding this database. 
 24
In panels A and B we observe a highly significant trend in the direction of the stoploss 
level before the event. Such a pattern is fully expected because only the stocks that 
eventually breach the stoploss are included in the sample. To gauge whether there is a 
price impact we need to look at the price path after the event. The driftless price path 
after an ELC-long breach suggests that the price impact from selling the underlying upon 
a stoploss event is negligible. At first this pattern is reassuring for ELC-long investors. 
However, our finding that after the event the price closely tracks K is inconsistent with 
the observed average residual value of 0.21% for intraday triggers. 
The stockprice pattern around ELC-short terminations strokes better with the observed 
average residual value shortfall. The clearly discernable hump that follows ELC-short 
knockouts is approximately 0.20% high. 
The difference between the price patterns may be due to the fact that ELC-shorts have 
larger open interests, or that issuers unwind short positions more aggressively.30 In any 
case the economic significance of the observed price impact is low. Moreover, the post-
trigger price path suggests that there are no large scale arbitrage activities associated with 
stoploss events. 
The turnover pattern also offers clues regarding the efficiency of the ELC-unwind 
procedure. We clearly distinguish an increased turnover around the stoploss event. The 
turnover naturally peaks during the trigger second, because it is the event-second which 
by definition sees trade in all stocks. The increased turnover before the event may be 
explained by the larger average price movements: When the average price moves more, 
there is likely to be more trade. After the trigger however there prices remain flat. We 
attribute the increased turnover during the half hour following the event (and during the 
hump, in panel B) to the unwinding of the ELC. The turnover pattern in panels C and D 
further suggest that some front running may occur, especially for ELC-shorts. It is not 
inconceivable that issuers simultaneously unwind and knock out the instruments. It is a 
                                                 
30 We checked the robustness of our findings by dividing the events into subsamples. For three subsamples 
made on calendar months and for a two subsamples based on the alphabetic order of underlying, the post 
event price pattern remains flat for ELC-long breaches, and hump-sized for ELC-short breaches. 
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frequently heard accusation, which is difficult to monitor. In any case, the post-event 
price path suggests that the economic loss to front-running is negligible. 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have described a novel and increasingly popular structured product, the 
Endless Leverage Certificate, which essentially is a long or short position with an 
attached margin account and a contractual stoploss procedure. 
ELCs have several desirable properties. First, the lower bound value of the product, the 
intrinsic value, is easy to ascertain and compare with market prices. Because the value of 
the option component is very small, investors are easily reassured about the fairness of 
the pricing, as they do not need to worry about implied volatilities or Greeks. Indeed, for 
ELC-longs we find an average premium vis-à-vis the lower bound value that is merely 
0.14% of the underlying value that it claims. 
Second, bid-ask spreads in the secondary market are narrow. This implies that for 
financially constrained investors and short horizon traders, ELCs may well offer higher 
expected returns than investing in the underlying directly. For constrained investors this 
is the case because margin fees and interest rates are likely to be significantly higher than 
the credit spread charged on ELCs’ financing levels. But even unconstrained investors 
may find it advantageous to buy an ELC instead of the underlying security. This is 
because due to its lever, the market value of an ELC is a fraction of the value of the 
underlying that it claims. If brokerage fees increase in transaction value, the cost of a 
round trip in an ELC is likely to be lower than a round trip in the underlying. The 
transaction cost advantage may well outweigh the slightly higher leverage adjusted bid 
ask spreads in the ELC market, and, depending on the investment horizon, the lower 
equilibrium expected returns. 
ELCs also have desirable ‘behavioral’ properties. First, the interests of the issuer and the 
investor are aligned: If an investor buys an ELC from an issuer, both parties hope that the 
security increases in value. If the underlying moves the in the right direction, the issuer 
holds a virtually riskfree bond on which it earns a significant credit spread, whereas the 
ELC-holder benefits via the equity component. If investors are overconfident upon a 
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lucky outcome, they may hold on to the ELC longer than is optimal, which also benefits 
the issuer. Second, the limited liability feature of ELCs is attractive to investors with loss 
aversion. Clearly, a portfolio of ELCs can wreak less havoc than a portfolio of equally 
levered positions with a shared margin account.31 
We derive a pricing algorithm that takes into account the limited liability option that 
accrues to the ELC-holder. In a world without transaction costs, this option justifies the 
credit spread on the financing levels. Because credit spreads are fixed over the term of the 
product, there is an optimal exercise level for the underlying. If the underlying breaches 
this level holders should exercise because the credit spread is no longer commensurate 
with the value of the limited liability option. We use Monte Carlo simulation to value a 
typical ELC on an average DAX stock and find its value to be less than 0.10% higher 
than the intrinsic value (less than 0.30% higher for ELC-shorts). Our analysis also reveals 
that a typical ELC-long (-short) written on an average DAX-stock should be exercised 
when the lever falls below 16.6 (10.8), and that the expected lifespan in a frictionless 
world with rational investors is less than a week. 
The Achilles heel of ELCs is the unwind procedure. Upon breach of a stoploss, issuers 
are contractually bound to exert “best efforts” to liquidate the hedging position and return 
the proceeds to ELC holders. However, the fairness of the unwind procedure is difficult 
to monitor. Issuers go to great length to improve transparency, among others by posting 
residual values and knockout dates and times on their websites. We study a large sample 
of residual values and find that upon stoploss selling, issuers passed on 99.73% of the 
stoploss trigger to the investors, and that upon stoploss buying, issuers paid 100.28% of 
the stoploss trigger to cover the shortposition. These shortfalls can be explained by 
discontinuous trading and by a price impact. An intraday event study does not reveal 
strong evidence for front-running of trigger events, and suggests that in any case, the 
economic cost of the price impact of the unwind procedure is low. 
 
                                                 
31 Of course, margin investors can submit stoploss orders for each position. Still, the limited liability feature 
of ELCs and the stoploss commitment is likely to be attractive to speculators. 
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Appendix: Monte Carlo Simulation 
We estimate the option component of a typical ELC in two stages. First we look for the 
optimal exercise level E*. Then we estimate the value of the option component, 
D - *( , , )L S D K E′′ ′′ . To find *E , we set Dt = €100 and Kt ∈ {€105, €103.50}. We try a high 
Et and set St = Et. We then simulate 100,000 runs for the underlying: 
1) set i = 1 
2) Let the critical levels increase: Set ELCi rt i tD D e
⋅
+ = ; ELCi rt i tK K e ⋅+ =  ; ELCi rt i tE E e ⋅+ =   
3) Randomly pick, with replacement, an overnight return from the pooled overnight 
returns of the DAX-stocks during last 15 years. With this we compute the hypothetical 
t iS +′ . If t i t iS K+ +′ < , the present value of the loan payoff is min( , )ir t i t ie D S− + +′ . Go to 7). 
4) Randomly pick, with replacement, an open-low return, to compute lowt iS + . If lowt i t iS K+ +< , 
the discounted loan-payoff is ir t ie D− + , Go to 7). 
5) Apply the low-close return that occurred on the same day for the same stock as the 
open-low return picked in 4). Use this return to compute a hypothetical t iS +′′ . If t i t iS E+ +′′ > , 
the discounted loan payoff is ir t ie D− + , go to 7) 
6) Set i to i+1, go to 2) 
7) Record the loan payoff, the lifespan of the ELC, the kind of termination (overnight-
stoploss, intraday-stoploss, or exercise), go to 1) to simulate another run. 
After 100,000 ‘runs’, we record the average discounted loan payoff. If it is higher than 
€100, the assumed Et is too high, and we repeat the simulation with a lower Et until we 
find the Et for which the average discounted loan payoff is just €100. We denote this Et 
the optimal exercise level *tE . 
To find the value of the ELC option component as a function of the underlying, we run 
the same simulations, but with *t tE E= , and let St vary between Kt and *tE . We also record 
the default probability, average life, and the recovery rates.  
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Remark: we assume 250 days per year, and no weekends nor holidays. The overnight 
interest rate r was set at 0.016% (4% annualized), approximately the historic average 
overnight rate. Using a different r gives virtually the same results. The option component 
is mainly driven by the tails of the intraday and nighttime distributions. 
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Figure 1: Payoff diagrams for Endless Leverage Certificates 
The picture on the left gives the payoff and the value of an ELC-long, as a function of the value 
of the underlying, S. The diagram on the right depicts the same relationships for an ELC-short. 
Notice that we exaggerate the wedge between the value and payoff lines. For most ELCs, the 
stoploss level K is sufficiently far from financing level D to make the option component 
inappreciably small. 
 
KD
S
Payoff, Value
    K D
S
Payoff, Value
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Figure 2: Overview of the market for Endless Leverage Certificates. 
Panel A gives the number of ELC-contracts that were outstanding, issued and terminated, in Germany and 
the Netherlands, in 2006, by month. Panel B shows the approximate market shares, during the last quarter 
of 2006, of all active issuers by trading turnover of their ELCs. Panel C gives a decomposition of the ELC 
market in different types of underlying, both in trading turnover and in number of contracts. Source: 
websites of ABN-AMRO, Commerzbank, DDI (Deutsches Derivate Institut) 
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Table 1: Overview of stock-ELCs by issuer 
This table gives the main characteristics of the ELCs of the eight largest issuers in Germany and the Netherlands. The information is accurate on 
January 2007. In the interest rate row, EONIA stands for Euro OverNight Index Average, and Euribor for the one-month Euro Interbank Offered 
Rate. Both are average effective interest rates on euro-denominated loans as quoted a large bank panel. In the Residual Value Reporting row RV 
stands for Residual Value, D for the financing level, and K for the stoploss level. 
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F Bank G Bank H
Name in Germany Mini Futures Stop Loss Turbos Unlimited Turbos WAVE XXL Mini Futures Mini Futures Endless Turbos Open End Turbos
Name in Netherlands Turbos Unlimited Speeders Speeders
Prospectus English / German English / German English / German German German German German German
Interest on longs Euribor + 150BP Euribor + 200BP Euribor + 140BP EONIA + 325BP Euribor + 200BP EONIA + 150BP Euribor + 200BP Euribor + 250BP
Interest on shorts Euribor - 150BP Euribor - 200BP 0% EONIA - 325BP Euribor - 200BP EONIA - 150 BP Euribor - 200BP Euribor - 250BP
Stop loss reset
monthly, first 
businessday       
after 15th
monthly, first 
businessday of 
each month
monthly, first 
businessday of 
each month
monthly, first 
businessday of 
each month
monthly, first 
businessday of 
each month
daily daily
monthly, 15th 
calender day of the 
month
Residual value reporting RV , date, D , K RV , date, K RV , date, K RV , date, D , K RV , date RV , date, D , K RV , date, D , K RV , date, K
Residual Value
Obtained from 
"unwinding of the 
hedging position 
on a best efforts 
basis". At least 
"minimum value 
during stoploss day 
and next day if 
stoploss in final 
three hours of 
trading"
Obtained from the 
"dissolution of 
Hedge Position". 
"Issuer will disolve 
Hedge Position 
within  60 minutes 
after Knock-Out."
"determined by the 
calculation agent in 
its own reasonable 
discretion as the 
fair market value"
"fair market value 
determined at the 
issuer's discretion 
based on the 
dissolution of the 
hedging position 
within the three 
hours following the 
stop-loss event"
"based on the 
knock-out market 
value of the 
underlying, which 
is at least the for 
the investor most 
unfavourable quote 
within the three 
hours following the 
knock-out event"
"The hedging 
position will be 
dissolved within 60 
minutes […] 
investors will be 
paid the difference 
between the 
realized value of 
the underlying and 
the financing level"
"depending on the 
dissolution of the 
hedging position, 
the issuer will try 
to pay a fair market 
value per 
certificate"
"At least the 
difference between 
value of the 
underlying as 
determined by the 
issuer within three 
hours after the stop-
loss event and the 
financing level"
yearly, last trading 
day of March
monthly, last day 
of month, upon 
written request
monthly,  first day 
of month,     28 
days notice
yearly, first 
business day after 
August 7
daily
monthly, first 
business day of the 
month
daily daily
Mostly 1:10 Mostly 1:10 Mostly 1:10 Mostly 1:10 Mixed between 1:1, 1:10, 1:100 Mostly 1:10 Mostly 1:10
Mostly 1:1 and 
1:10
Exercisable
Ratios
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Table 2: Overview of stock-ELCs in Germany 
This table gives further ELC characteristics for the eight largest issuers in the German market. The stock ELCs include ELCs written on non-
German stocks. Credit spreads are given in basis points. The lever is defined as S/|S-D| and the stoploss premium as |K-D|/D. The characteristics 
were computed for all stock-ELCs outstanding on January 16th 2007. Average bid-ask spreads are based on five snapshots in January 2007. We 
sourced the data from Internet broker www.cortalconsors.com, and DDI. 
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F Bank G Bank H
Total ELCs 2,106 676 2,251 889 1,451 813 525 1,518
Stock ELCs 1,193 526 1,637 666 686 723 327 991
Nr. stocks covered 78 47 83 41 41 37 34 43
Longs 1,318 423 1,733 647 810 599 343 1,270
Shorts 788 253 518 242 641 214 182 248
credit spread (BP) 150 200 140 300 200 150 200 250
average lever 3.36 6.18 3.98 4.08 6.36 4.08 5.63 3.07
    at issue 6.21 11.21 9.33 7.25 7.03 8.86 8.38 4.91
av. stoploss premium 9.1% 3.5% 5.5% 6.4% 7.6% 7.9% 4.8% 6.6%
average age (days) 339 126 384 225 163 349 151 541
credit spread (BP) 150 200 310 300 200 150 200 250
average lever 4.12 7.80 5.41 6.45 7.15 7.18 6.97 4.60
    at issue 4.42 6.77 5.92 7.80 6.52 7.52 6.55 4.30
av. stoploss premium 9.80% 3.97% 5.62% 6.56% 7.77% 6.49% 5.30% 6.22%
average age (days) 241 147 253 63 153 164 112 398
1.10% 1.22% 0.84% 1.29% 1.58% 1.21% 1.44% 1.03%
0.30% 0.18% 0.20% 0.27% 0.24% 0.25% 0.24% 0.31%
322,600 415,577 623,640 315,604 216,849 278,698 198,765 89,760average monthly trading 
turnover per ELC (€) 
L
o
n
g
s
S
h
o
r
t
s
average quoted bid/ask 
spread (% of midprice)
average leverage-adjusted 
spread (%)
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Table 3: Bid-Ask Spreads of Stocks, ELCs, and Options 
We take 20 intraday snapshots of bid and ask quotes for 30 German DAX stocks and 25 Dutch AEX, and five snapshots for all ELCs and options 
written on them. The sampling snapshots were taken on five different days in January 2007. The ratio adjusted €-spread for an ELC is the gross  
€-spread multiplied by the ratio. The ratio and delta adjusted €-spreads for the covered warrants and options are computed by multiplying the 
gross €-spread with the option’s ratio (unity for all Euronext options) and the option’s delta, which is computed with the Black-Scholes formula. In 
the bottom panel we list the proportional spreads. The gross spreads are the spreads (bid minus ask) divided by the midprice of the derivative. The 
leverage adjusted spreads are the gross spreads divided by the lever. The lever for an ELC is defined as S/|S-D|. The lever for an option is defined 
as the hedge-ratio multiplied by the value of the underlying, divided by the midprice of the security (δS/C for calls, δS/P for puts). 
30 stocks 25 stocks
gross
ratio 
adjusted gross
ratio and delta 
adjusted gross
ratio 
adjusted gross
delta 
adjusted
average 6.2 4.9 17.3 2.1 25.7 2.4 6.7 8.5 11.5 18.4
min 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 5.0
25%-percentile 2.0 1.0 6.0 1.0 12.1 1.0 2.0 6.0 5.0 10.0
median 3.0 2.0 10.0 1.0 17.2 1.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 13.1
75%-percentile 5.0 5.0 20.0 2.0 25.4 3.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 21.0
max 150.0 150.0 200.0 22.0 462.9 13.0 30.0 30.0 45.0 291.5
stdev 16.4 10.9 25.1 2.7 45.9 2.6 5.9 4.5 6.8 17.2
30 stocks 25 stocks
gross
leverage 
adjusted gross
leverage 
adjusted gross
leverage 
adjusted gross
leverage 
adjusted
average 6.4 97.7 24.3 655.3 46.4 8.7 143.5 35.0 644.5 97.8
min 1.3 2.6 1.1 7.9 2.1 1.7 25.9 2.9 26.4 2.6
25%-percentile 3.2 36.6 12.4 109.3 18.5 3.4 75.6 21.2 162.7 38.9
median 4.7 62.4 17.8 235.3 29.5 7.4 113.5 29.7 286.4 70.2
75%-percentile 6.8 115.1 26.2 606.1 50.8 10.5 181.8 40.4 555.6 114.0
max 37.9 1,639.3 292.5 14,782.6 4,607.6 30.4 800.0 196.2 10,000.0 827.2
stdev 6.0 112.5 24.2 1,244.1 106.4 6.8 103.6 22.1 1,198.2 95.0
5,129 ELCs
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
S
p
r
e
a
d
 
(
b
a
s
i
s
p
o
i
n
t
s
)
18,003 covered warrants
18,003 covered warrants
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
S
p
r
e
a
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
€
-
c
e
n
t
)
444 ELCs 6,141 Euronext options
6,141 Euronext options444 ELCs
Netherlands: AEX-stocks
5,129 ELCs
Germany: Xetra-DAX stocks
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Table 4: Determinants of Leverage Adjusted Bid-Ask Spreads 
This table gives the results of a regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the leverage-adjusted bid-ask spread, which is the spread for 
the ELC, expressed as a proportion of the value of the underlying position. The data come from five quote snapshots on different days in January 
2007 of 2,572 ELC-longs and 849 ELC-shorts written on the 30 Xetra-DAX stocks, by the ten largest issuers. The lever is calculated as S/|S-D| 
and the stoploss premium as |K-D|/D. The volatility of the underlying is the annualized standard deviation of daily returns computed over up to 15 
years worth of historical data. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate a significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
regression model: I II III IV I II III IV
bid-ask spread underlying (BP) 0.48 *** 0.52 *** 0.07 0.08 0.44 *** 0.45 *** 0.09 0.10 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
lever 0.36 ** -0.12 0.00 -0.25 * 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.21 *
(0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15)
stoploss-premium 1.73 *** 2.26 *** -0.19 -0.11 1.76 *** 1.90 *** 0.92 1.14 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.95) (0.98)
annual volatility underlying (%) 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 0.30 *** 0.27 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
age (years) -2.64 *** -1.93 *** -1.50 ** -1.27 **
(0.34) (0.47) (0.67) (0.72)
issuer dummies ? ? ? ?
day dummies ? ? ? ?
underlying dummies ? ? ? ?
observations 12,860 11,472 12,860 11,472 4,243 3,818 4,243 3,818
adjusted R 2 0.120 0.144 0.701 0.699 0.314 0.316 0.777 0.780
ELC-longs ELC-shorts
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Table 5: ELC overpricing vis-à-vis Intrinsic Values 
We take five intraday snapshots of bid and ask quotes for 5,129 ELCs written on German DAX stocks and 444 ELCs written on Dutch AEX 
stocks and match them with the contemporaneous bid and ask quotes of the underlying securities. For each ELC-snapshot, we compute the 
absolute overpricing as AOP ≡ ½(ELCA+ELCB)-|½(SA+SB)-D|, the absolute relative overpricing as AOP/|½(SA+SB)-D|, and the overpricing relative 
to the underlying as AOP/(½(SA+SB)). 
absolute 
(€)
%-age of 
|S -D |
%-age of 
underlying
absolute 
(€)
%-age of 
|S -D |
%-age of 
underlying
absolute 
(€)
%-age of 
|S -D |
%-age of 
underlying
absolute 
(€)
%-age of 
|S -D |
%-age of 
underlying
average 0.02 0.51 0.14 0.02 1.00 0.20 0.01 0.92 0.26 0.05 1.12 0.27
1%-percentile -0.56 -3.62 -1.09 -0.09 -3.65 -1.09 -0.19 -2.48 -0.65 -0.06 -1.21 -0.18
25%-percentile 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.05
median 0.01 0.30 0.10 0.01 0.58 0.10 0.02 0.57 0.17 0.02 0.79 0.21
75%-percentile 0.03 0.89 0.26 0.03 1.55 0.26 0.04 1.39 0.36 0.06 1.47 0.39
99%-percentile 0.48 5.70 1.98 0.22 9.13 1.98 0.10 7.99 1.42 0.27 9.65 1.26
standard deviation 0.20 1.57 0.41 0.08 2.23 0.41 0.06 1.87 0.50 0.08 1.68 0.30
3,898 ELC-Longs 307 ELC-Longs 137 ELC-Shorts
Netherlands: 444 ELCs on 25 AEX-stocksGermany: 5,129 ELCs on 30 DAX stocks
1,231 ELC-Shorts
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Table 6: Determinants of the ELC Premiums  
This table gives the results of a regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the ELC premium vis-à-vis the intrinsic value, as a 
proportion expressed in basispoints, of the value of the underlying. The data comes from five quote snapshots on different days in January 2007 of 
2,572 ELC-longs and 849 ELC-shorts written on the 30 Xetra-DAX stocks, by the ten largest issuers. The lever is defined as S/|S-D| and the 
stoploss premium as |K-D|/D. The volatility of the underlying is the annualized standard deviation of daily returns computed over up to 15 years 
worth of historical data. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
regression model: I II III IV I II III IV
lever -0.52 ** -0.14 -0.58 -0.50 * 1.22 1.02 1.15 1.33 
(0.24) (0.16) (0.39) (0.28) (1.08) (1.04) (1.17) (1.46)
stoploss-premium 1.53 *** 1.58 *** 1.14 1.17 2.08 *** 2.14 *** 2.21 2.42 
(0.23) (0.26) (1.37) (1.33) (0.45) (0.48) (1.91) (2.02)
annual volatility underlying (%) 0.62 *** 0.59 *** 0.97 ** 1.03 **
(0.17) (0.18) (0.44) (0.42)
age (years) -1.11 * -1.28 ** -0.52 ** -0.43 
(0.54) (0.50) -(0.22) (0.33)
issuer dummies ? ? ? ?
day dummies ? ? ? ?
underlying dummies ? ? ? ?
observations 12,860 11,472 12,860 11,472 4,243 3,818 4,243 3,818
adjusted R 2 0.022 0.020 0.365 0.367 0.010 0.011 0.192 0.191
ELC-longs ELC-shorts
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Figure 2: historical frequencies of overnight and daytime returns 
The dots make up a histogram of all overnight and daytime returns for the 30 Xetra-Dax stocks 
over the 15 years until 11 February 2007. In total there are 97,288 returns. The Bin-width is 10 
basispoints. The continuous line shows the Normal probability distribution function with the 
same mean and standard deviation. In the upper corners of the graph we amplified the tails of the 
distribution. For the overnight returns, the average was 11 basispoints, the standard deviation 119 
basispoints, the skewness 1.99, and the excess kurtosis 139.87. For the daytime returns the 
statistics were -7 basispoints, 174 basispoints, 0.01, and 6.30 respectively. 
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Figure 3: Monte-Carlo estimated values for the ELC option value 
Using pooled historical intraday returns of all Xetra-DAX stocks, we estimate the value of the 
option component of ELCs. We simulate the payoff to an ELC financing level with D = €100 that 
is collateralized by an underlying which is be sold if it hits stoploss-level K = €103.5 or €105. 
Both D and K increase at rates that are 2% or 1.5% higher than the riskfree rate. We first use 
Monte Carlo simulation to search for the optimal exercise level, at which the value of the option 
component is zero. We find optimal exercise levels of €106.40, €108.30, and €109.30 for ELC-
longs and €91.50, €89.60 and €88.20. We then use Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the value 
of the ELC for stockprices in the [K,E]-intervals. 
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Figure 4: Theoretical premiums versus observed premiums. 
We compile 25,645 snapshots of ELC prices combined with financing levels and underlying 
prices. We multiply the ELC- and underlying prices by 100/D and plot the differences between 
rescaled prices and intrinsic values as a function of the rescaled price of the underlying. Panel A 
gives the picture for ELC-longs, Panel B for ELC-shorts. Notice that in both panels there are 
many observations that fall outside the graph. The bold lines are the Monte Carlo approximated 
theoretical prices for an ELC with K = €103.5 (€96.6 for panel B) and a credit spread of 200 
basispoints, written on a hypothetical typical DAX-stock. 
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Table 7: Residual Value Analysis 
We collect 1,801 residual values from the websites of four ELC-issuers who report alongside the residual 
value, stoploss level K and financing level D. We compute the differences between the reported residual 
value and the theoretical stoploss value |K-D| (times the ratio, if applicable). In panel A we describe the 
distribution of these residual value shortfalls for the entire sample and several subsamples. The “percentage 
zero” rows give the proportions of residual values that fell within a one €-cent rounding rage of the 
theoretical stoploss value.  
 
€   %  %  €   %  %  €   %  %  
average -0.024 -3.186 -0.237 -0.022 -2.673 -0.247 -0.024 -3.518 -0.231
minimum -1.86 -100.00 -11.04 -1.86 -77.01 -9.95 -0.68 -100.00 -11.04
median 0.00 -0.52 -0.04 0.00 -0.33 -0.03 0.00 -0.64 -0.04
maximum 0.36 48.37 3.74 0.36 33.33 3.74 0.36 48.37 2.55
standard deviation 0.10 10.22 0.78 0.13 8.21 0.83 0.08 11.33 0.75
%-age zero 50.47 51.03 50.00
%-age positive 8.66 9.84 7.67
978 Shorts
relative  
to |K -D |
relative  
to K
absolute 
shortfall
relative  
to |K -D |
relative  
to K
absolute 
shortfall
823 Longs
relative  
to |K -D |
Entire Sample
absolute 
shortfall
relative  
to K
 
 
€   %  %  €   %  %  
average -0.027 -8.56 -0.54 -0.024 -2.722 -0.211
minimum -1.86 -100.00 # -9.95 # -0.82 -35.15 # -4.73 #
median 0.00 -0.73 # -0.04 # 0.00 -0.20 # -0.02 #
maximum 0.36 9.16 # 0.22 # 0.36 33.33 # 3.74 #
standard deviation 0.13 9.42 1.06 0.10 10.29 0.76
%-age zero 10.49 53.92
%-age positive 0.70 9.35
143 overnight triggers
relative   
to |K -D |
relative   
to K
absolute 
shortfall
1,658 daytime triggers
relative   
to |K -D |
relative   
to K
absolute 
shortfall
 
 
average -0.237 -0.238 -0.445 -0.109
minimum -9.95 # -5.51 # -11.04 # -5.28 #
median -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.00
maximum 3.74 # 2.30 # 2.55 # 0.22 #
standard deviation 0.74 # 0.56 # 1.89 # 0.77 #
percentage zero 48.98 # 41.23 # 37.63 # 93.53 #
percentage positive 13.38 # 3.46 # 16.13 # 2.88 #
observations 894 386 93 285
Bank 4
residual value shortfall relative to K  (%)
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3
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Figure 5: Intraday Event Study 
We collect 226 stoploss triggers during August-October 2006 for ELC written on 42 German 
stocks for which we obtained intraday data from the Institut für Finanzwirtschaft, Banken und 
Versicherungen (FBV) of Karlsruhe University. For every second in the six hour window around 
the trigger event, we record the last traded price and the trading volume during the second. We 
plot the average rescaled stockprices, Pt and the average trading volume relative to the day’s 
average per second volume, Vt for ELC-long and ELC-short triggers. 
Pt and Vt are computed using: ,
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Panel A: Event study on 82 ELC-long triggers, plotted over a six hour event window 
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Panel B: Event study on 144 ELC-short triggers, plotted over a six hour event window 
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Figure 5: Intraday Event Study (continued) 
Stockprice and volume plots plotted over a two minute event window around the stoploss trigger.  
Panel C: Event study on 82 ELC-long triggers, plotted over a two minute event window 
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Panel C: Event study on 144 ELC-long triggers, plotted over a two minute event window 
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